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Attorneys at Law 
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CHEYLYNN HAYMAN 
ch@pwlaw.com 
July 13, 2006 
Pat Bartholomew 
Clerk of Court 
Utah Supreme Court 
450 S. State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Carbaugh v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd., et al., 20050822-SC 
Dear Ms. Bartholomew: 
It has come to our attention that, when filing our appellee brief in the above-identified 
case, we inadvertently failed to attach copies of the following unpublished Utah Court of Appeals 
opinions in our addendum: 
Aiono v. Hogan, 2005 UT App 331U 
BMC W. Corp. v. Deseret Crest Dev., Inc., 2002 UT App 193U 
Gillett v. Price, 2004 UT App 460U 
Keeney v. Campbell Soup Co., 2005 UT App 514U 
Included herewith are accurate copies of the foregoing unpublished opinions. We 
apologize for any inconvenience this oversight may have caused the Court. 
Sincerely, 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Cheylynn Hayman 
l
aumaJt 
,*y£2». 
PARRW\DDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Pat Bartholomew 
July 13,2006 
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cc (w/o enclosures): Alan R. Brayton 
S. Brook Millard 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-00O00 
Voi Aiono and Cheryl Aiono, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Kendall Hogan, State Farm 
Insurance, and Does 1 through 
50, 
Defendants and Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20040769-CA 
F I L E D 
(July 29, 2005; 
2005 UT App 331 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 030905421 
The Honorable Ann Boyden 
Attorneys: David 0. Drake, Midvale, for Appellants 
David N. Mortensen and Jared R. Casper, Provo, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Greenwood. 
PER CURIAM: 
Voi Aiono and Cheryl Aiono (the Aionos) appeal from the 
final judgment of the district court dismissing their complaint. 
The Aionos argue that the district court erred when it granted 
Kendall Hogan's motion for summary judgment and when it denied 
the Aionos' motion to amend their complaint. We affirm. 
The Aionos filed a complaint in July 2000 against Hogan, 
State Farm Insurance (State Farm), and other Doe defendants after 
an automobile accident. The complaint was not served and the 
case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Two days before the 
one year savings statute expired, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 
(2002), the Aionos refiled their complaint. Hogan was the only 
party served with a summons and the complaint. After filing an 
answer and a stipulated discovery plan, Hogan filed a motion for 
summary judgment. 
The Aionos did not file a response to Hogan's motion for 
summary judgment. Instead, the Aionos filed a motion to amend 
their complaint or, in the alternative, a motion for additional 
time. The Aionos alleged that they had named Hogan as the wrong 
party and that they should be allowed to "reflect Teresa R. 
Peterson as the proper defendant." In the alternative, the 
Aionos sought additional time "to conduct discovery on the issue 
of potential liability of [Hogan]." 
After oral argument, the district court granted the motion 
for summary judgment and denied the Aionos' motions. Regarding 
the latter, the district court specifically ruled that there was 
no unity of interest between Hogan and the alleged tortfeasor, 
Ms. Peterson, that could permit another amendment to the 
complaint to relate back to the filing of that complaint. The 
district court found that any amended complaint filed by the 
Aionos would thus be timed barred. 
Summary judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues as 
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). We give a trial 
court's decision to grant summary judgment no deference and 
review it for correctness. See Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81,^15, 
57 P.3d 997. 
The Aionos' complaint alleged that Hogan negligently 
operated a motor vehicle and that such negligence directly caused 
their injuries. Hogan's motion for summary judgment was based 
upon Hogan's uncontested averments that he was not the driver of 
the vehicle involved in the underlying accident, but merely the 
co-owner of the vehicle with his son. Furthermore, Hogan averred 
that he did not give permission to the driver of the vehicle, Ms. 
Peterson, to operate the vehicle on the date of the accident. 
Thus, the uncontested statements set forth in Hogan's affidavit 
rendered summary judgment appropriate. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) 
("The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."). 
Further, the district court correctly denied the Aionos' 
motion to amend their complaint. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
15(c) governs the relation back of amendments. Rule 15(c) 
"allows a plaintiff to cure defects in his or her original 
complaint despite the intervening running of a statute of 
limitations." Penrose v. Ross, 2003 UT App 157,^9, 71 P.3d 631. 
"Generally, however, 'rule 15(c) will not apply to an amendment 
which substitutes or adds new parties for those brought before 
the court by the original pleadings.'" Id. (quoting Doxev-Lavton 
Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976)). 
There is an exception to this rule, which "'operates where 
there is a relation back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, 
when new and old parties have an identity of interest.'" Id. 
(quoting Doxey-Layton Co., 548 P.2d at 906). "'New defendants 
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sought to be added must have an identity of interest with the 
original party named in the complaint, so it can be assumed or 
proved the relation back is not prejudicial.'" Id. at ^20 
(quoting Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247,1129, 53 P.3d 2) 
(additional citations and quotations omitted). "'Identity of 
interest' as used in this context means that the parties are so 
closely related in their business operations that notice of the 
action against one serves to provide notice of the action to the 
other." Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 217 
(Utah 1984)/ see also Penrose, 2003 UT App 157 at Hl6 (holding 
that an identity of interest "requires parties to have the 'same' 
interest"). The Aionos have failed to make any showing that an 
identity of interest exists between any relevant parties in this 
case. 
At oral argument, the Aionos admitted that there was no 
identity of interest between Hogan and Ms. Peterson. Instead, 
the Aionos argued, as they do on appeal, that there is an 
identity of interest between State Farm, whom the Aionos never 
served, and Ms. Peterson, of whom there is scant record evidence. 
The district court correctly held that this relationship was too 
attenuated and properly determined that the relation back 
doctrine does not apply to an amendment that adds new parties who 
have no identity of interest with existing parties. See, e.g., 
Penrose, 2003 UT App 157 at Hl9 (holding that father who owned 
vehicle did not have identity of interest with son who drove the 
vehicle); Perry, 681 P.2d at 217 (third-party action against 
supplier and manufacturer did not relate back to the filing of 
the original action as there was no evidence showing of any 
identity of interest with the third-party defendants other than 
privity of contract). Accordingly, the district court correctly 
denied the motion to amend the complaint. 
Finally, the Aionos argue that the district court erred when 
it denied their motion for an extension of time. A review of the 
record reveals that a proper request under rule 56(f) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure was never made to the district court. 
Rule 56(f) states: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that the party 
cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the 
party's opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other 
order as is just. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). 
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By its clear language, rule 56(f) contemplates the filing of 
an affidavit. See id. Thus, Utah appellate courts have "refused 
to consider an argument that further discovery was necessary when 
the appellant had failed to file a Rule 56(f) affidavit." 
Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 840 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). The Aionos did not file an affidavit as required by 
the rule. 
Furthermore, "even if a party does file an affidavit or the 
court is willing to consider other material in place of an 
affidavit, the opposing party must nevertheless explain how the 
continuance will aid his opposition to summary judgment." Id. at 
841. As set forth in Callioux, 
the mere averment of exclusive knowledge or 
control of the facts by the moving party is 
not adequate: the opposing party must show 
to the best of his ability what facts are 
within the movant's exclusive knowledge or 
control; what steps have been taken to obtain 
the desired information . . .; and that he is 
desirous of taking advantage of these 
discovery procedures. 
Id. at 840-41; see also Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 312-14 
(Utah 1984) (setting forth the requirements for a rule 56(f) 
application). Aside from the failure to set forth an affidavit, 
the Aionos failed to make any showing below that additional 
discovery was required in this case. Therefore, the district 
court correctly denied the Aionos' motion for addition time. 
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
BMC West Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Deseret Crest Development, Inc , 
Jessica Barker, and Does 1-20, 
Defendants and Appellants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No 20010269-CA 
F I L E D 
June 6, 2002 
l [ ^002UTApp193 = j | 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Leon A Dever 
Attorneys 
Gary H Weight, Provo, for Appellants 
F Mark Hansen, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Orme 
ORME, Judge 
We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record and 
the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument" Utah R App P 29(a)(3) 
The trial court adopted, inter alia, the following statement by Plaintiff as its own finding "Defendants have 
oppos[ed] summary judgment with an affidavit they knew was not made on personal knowledge in violation of 
Rule 56(e) " ^ On appeal, Defendants have not marshaled the evidence supporting this finding and then shown 
why the evidence so marshaled is legally insufficient to support the finding See State v Gamblin, 2000 UT 
44,^ 117 n 2, 1 P 3d 1108 We therefore conclude that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in striking Barker's 
affidavit on behalf of Deseret Crest Development See Utah R Civ P 56(e), GNS Partnership v Fullmer, 873 
P 2d 1157, 1164 (Utah Ct App 1994) 
With respect to the other rule 37 sanctions imposed by the trial court, the following finding, incorporated from 
Plaintiffs memorandum and not effectively challenged on appeal, amply supports the sanctions imposed 
"Defendants have clearly demonstrated a disregard for the rules of court, and an intent to delay, hinder and 
obstruct[ ]" See Morton v Continental Baking Co , 938 P 2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997) (holding imposition of rule 37 
sanctions is within trial court's discretion when evidence supports finding that sanctioned party has engaged in 
'"persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process'") (quoting WW & WB Gardner, Inc v Park West 
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Village, Inc , 568 P 2d 734, 738 (Utah 1977)) 
Defendants contend that disputed issues of fact remain, precluding summary judgment Defendants fail, however, 
to identify any portion of an affidavit, deposition, or answers to interrogatories, which has not been properly 
stricken, that disputes Plaintiffs factual contentions Thus, we conclude the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment was also proper(2) See Utah R Civ P 56(c) 
Accordingly, we affirm and remand only for a determination and award of the reasonable attorney fees and costs 
incurred by 
BMC West on appeal SeeManagement Servs Corp v Development Assocs , 617 P 2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980) 
Gregory K Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR 
Norman H Jackson, 
Presiding Judge 
Pamela T Greenwood, Judge 
1 Defendants contend that the trial court made only a "vague incorporation by reference of language from 
appellee's supporting memorandum," and that this "is insufficient to establish that the trial court relied on Rule 56 
in striking the affidavits " On the contrary, the court explicitly stated "For the reasons set forth in BMC West's 
supporting memoranda, incorporated here by reference as the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the 
Court grants BMC's motion[ ]" Rule 56 was specifically relied on in BMC West's memorandum referred to by the 
court 
2 Because Defendants took no action below under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, they waived 
their opportunity to argue on appeal that summary judgment should not have been granted because Ben 
Magelsen has yet to be deposed 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
David K. Gillett and Majestic Air Services, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Steve Price, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20040682-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 9, 2004) 
I 2004 UT App 460 I 
Third District, Sandy Department 
The Honorable Royal I. Hansen 
Attorneys: Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan, for Appellants 
Randall L. Skeen, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Orme. 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on motions by this court and 
Appellee Steve Price for summary dismissal on the basis of lack of 
jurisdiction. See Utah R. App. P. 10. The civil claim filed in 
district court related to allegations of theft of property. The 
vjintn v. i ii^ c; i age z. ui j 
district court granted Price's motion for summary judgment in an 
order issued on June 16, 2004. 
In response to the court's order, Appellant David Gillett filed a 
motion captioned "Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration [Defendant's 
Motion For Summary Judgment]." This motion was filed on June 9, 2004, 
after the initial ruling on the motion for summary judgment was made, 
but prior to issuance of the final order. Gillett argued in the 
motion for reconsideration that the district court mischaracterized 
the documents relied upon in determining the statute of limitations 
had expired on Gillett's claim. Gillett also argued in the motion 
that factual issues existed and, as a result, summary judgment was 
improper. 
Gillett's notice of appeal was filed on August 4, 2004. The 
notice of appeal was not timely filed from the order granting summary 
judgment, which was the final judgment. While Gillett's notice of 
appeal purports to appeal the denial of his motion to reconsider, he 
argues in his response to the motions for summary dismissal that the 
motion to reconsider should be construed as either a motion to alter 
or amend judgment or a motion for a new trial, pursuant to rule 59(e) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. He cites Salt Lake Knee & 
Sports Rehabilitation v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, 9 09 
P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1995) and Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 
P.2d 1061, 1065 (Utah 1991), in support of his proposition. 
If construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment or a motion 
for a new trial, Gillett's notice of appeal would be timely because 
these are post-trial motions, enumerated in rule 4(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which toll the time for filing a notice 
of appeal until thirty days after issuance of an order denying the 
post-trial motion. See Watkiss & Campbell, 808 P.2d at 1064. 
Gillett's motion, however, is not properly construed as a motion 
to amend or alter judgment or as a motion for a new trial. There is 
no indication that the trial court construed Gillett's motion as 
either a motion to alter or amend the judgment or as a motion for a 
new trial. Furthermore, the motion does not meet the requirements for 
either motion. 
This court reviews the rulings of the trial court. Therefore, 
this court considers whether the trial court has abused its 
discretion in construing, or not construing, a motion to reconsider 
as a motion that tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal. 
Nothing in the district court's order denying Gillett's motion 
indicates that the court construed Gillett's motion as anything other 
than a motion to reconsider. Thus the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in declining to construe the motion as a rule 4(b) 
motion, especially given that the motion does not meet the 
requirements of a rule 59 motion. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a),(e). 
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Because Gillett's notice of appeal was timely from the order 
denying the motion to reconsider, the question remains whether this 
court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal of that order. Because 
the rules of civil procedure do not allow for a motion to reconsider, 
such a motion will be reviewed only if it could been properly brought 
under a rule, based on its substance, but was incorrectly captioned. 
See Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, 909 P.2d at 268. As we 
have already explained, Gillette's motion cannot be construed as a 
motion made under the rules of civil procedure. 
For the forgoing reasons, this appeal is dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction because of an untimely notice of appeal. 
Price seeks attorney fees and costs based on rules 33 and 34 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Price has not sufficiently 
argued, and we do not conclude, that this appeal was frivolous or for 
purposes of delay. We therefore decline to award attorney fees. Costs 
are awarded by operation of rule 34(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
0 0 O 0 0 — 
Tina Keeney, parent and 
natural guardian; and Chase 
Keeney, a minor, 
Plaintiffs and Appellant, 
v. 
Campbell Soup Company, 
Defendant and Appellee, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20040981-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 1, 2005! 
2005 UT App 514 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 030920573 
The Honorable L.A. Dever 
Attorneys: William R. Hadley, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Scott M. Petersen, David N. Kelley, and Daniel Irvin, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Thorne. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
Tina Keeney appeals the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Campbell Soup Company (Campbell). We 
affirm. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn from them in the light most 
favorable to Keeney, who is the nonmoving party in this case. 
See Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist., 2002 UT 130,^13, 63 P.3d 705, 
We affirm only if there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
See id. (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). We review the trial 
court's conclusions of law for correctness. See id. 
To prove negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), 
a claimant must prove "'illness or bodily harm.'" Harnicher v. 
University of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 69-70 (Utah 1998) 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313 (1965)). "' [T] he 
emotional distress suffered must be severe; it must be such that 
a reasonable [person], normally constituted, would be unable to 
adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the 
circumstances of the case.'" Id. at 70 (second alteration in 
original) (citations omitted). While "illness" encompasses 
mental illness stemming from the negligent act of another, such 
illness must be established by expert testimony, Hansen v. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 975 (Utah 1993), and may 
not be merely subjective, see Harnicher, 962 P.2d at 71. 
Keeney claims that, as a result of her encounter with the 
tooth in the can of Campbell's soup, she suffered the following 
illness and bodily harm: (a) loss of twenty to thirty pounds, (b) 
hyper-vigilance toward prepared foods, (c) abnormal and aberrant 
behavior associated with food, and (d) teasing by fellow 
employees for her unusual behavior toward food. Keeney admits in 
her brief that she never sought medical attention for herself and 
never contracted any infectious diseases relating to the 
encounter. 
We agree with the trial court that Keeney has not alleged 
the type of illness or bodily harm sufficient to support an NIED 
claim. This case is similar to Hansen, where several workers 
learned they had been exposed to asbestos over the course of a 
few months. See 858 P.2d at 972. Although the workers suffered 
respiratory problems at the time of exposure, they had no lasting 
physical difficulties. See id. at 973. Nonetheless, they filed 
an NIED claim, alleging that their worries about the exposure had 
caused general anxiety and sleeplessness. See id. In its 
review, the Utah Supreme Court focused its analysis on two 
factors: (1) the duration and nature of the exposure to the 
dangerous substance and (2) the likelihood that disease will 
actually occur. See id. at 975. The court concluded that due to 
the limited exposure and lack of asbestos-related disease, their 
anxiety was not of a magnitude with which "a reasonable person, 
normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope." Id. 
Here, where the exposure and the danger of disease is much 
more attenuated than that in Hansen, we reach the same 
conclusion. Keeney's distress after the exposure has produced 
some weight loss, anxiety, and vigilance in preventing future 
exposure, but the alleged magnitude of these effects is belied by 
the fact that her exposure never resulted in an infectious 
disease after three years and that she has never sought medical 
assistance for herself. Moreover, she has not provided expert 
testimony that her anxiety is a symptom of mental illness. We 
recognize that Keeney's experience may have been disturbing, but 
the resulting anxiety, vigilance, and weight loss is within a 
reasonable person's power to cope. 
Keeney also argues that the trial court should have granted 
her request for a mental health evaluation. However, she made 
this request only in her memorandum in opposition to Campbell's 
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motion for summary judgment and never asserted it as a formal 
rule 56(f) motion with the required affidavits. See Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(f) (requiring party to submit affidavits stating reasons 
why it could not obtain the evidence requested during discovery). 
Accordingly, we decline to remand the case to reopen discovery. 
See Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8,^57, 70 P.3d 1 
("Simply asserting that more discovery is needed and that a 
proper response to the motion for summary judgment is impossible 
. . . is inadequate to overcome summary judgment. Parties . . . 
cannot justify further discovery without providing a viable 
theory as to the nature of the facts they wish to obtain." 
(internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
We affirm. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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